Collected by International Association of Lawyers Against
      Nuclear Arms

      1: Opinion of the Upper Administrative Court at Mnster,
      March 11, 1999 (Az: 13A 3894/94.A):

      "Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have neither been nor are now
      exposed to regional or countrywide group persecution in the
      Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." (Thesis 1)

      2: Opinion of the Bavarian Administrative Court, October 29,
      1998 (Az: 22 BA 94.34252):
      "The Foreign Office's status reports of May 6, June 8 and
      July 13, 1998, given to the plaintiffs in the summons to a
      verbal deliberation, do not allow the conclusion that there is
      group persecution of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Not
      even regional group persecution, applied to all ethnic
      Albanians from a specific part of Kosovo, can be observed
      with sufficient certainty. The violent actions of the Yugoslav
      military and police since February 1998 were aimed at
      separatist activities and are no proof of a persecution of the
      whole Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo or in a part of it.
      What was involved in the Yugoslav violent actions and
      excesses since February 1998 was a selective forcible action
      against the military underground movement (especially the
      KLA) and people in immediate contact with it in its areas of
      operation. ...A state program or persecution aimed at the
      whole ethnic group of Albanians exists neither now nor

      3: Intelligence report from the Foreign Office, January 12,
      1999 to the Administrative Court of Trier (Az:
      514-516.80/32 426):

      "Even in Kosovo an explicit political persecution linked to
      Albanian ethnicity is not verifiable. The East of Kosovo is
      still not involved in armed conflict. Public life in cities like
      Pristina, Urosevac, Gnjilan, etc. has, in the entire conflict
      period, continued on a relatively normal basis." The "actions
      of the security forces (were) not directed against the
      Kosovo-Albanians as an ethnically defined group, but against
      the military opponent and its actual or alleged supporters."

      4: Intelligence report from the Foreign Office January 6,
      1999 to the Bavarian Administrative Court, Ansbach:
      "At this time, an increasing tendency is observable inside the
      Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of refugees returning to their
      dwellings. ... Regardless of the desolate economic situation in
      the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (according to official
      information of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 700,000
      refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzogovina have found
      lodging since 1991), no cases of chronic malnutrition or
      insufficient medical treatment among the refugees are known
      and significant homelessness has not been observed. ...
      According to the Foreign Office's assessment, individual
      Kosovo-Albanians (and their immediate families) still have
      limited possibilities of settling in those parts of Yugoslavia in
      which their countrymen or friends already live and who are
      ready to take them in and support them."

      5. Report of the Foreign Office March 15, 1999 (Az:
      514-516,80/33841) to the Administrative Court, Mainz:

      "As laid out in the status report of November 18, 1998, the
      KLA has resumed its positions after the partial withdrawal of
      the (Serbian) security forces in October 1998, so it once
      again controls broad areas in the zone of conflict. Before the
      beginning of spring 1999 there were still clashes between the
      KLA and security forces, although these have not until now
      reached the intensity of the battles of spring and summer

      6. Opinion of the Administrative Court of
      Baden-Wrttemberg, February 4, 1999 (Az: A 14 S

      "The various reports presented to the senate all agree that the
      often feared humanitarian catastrophe threatening the
      Albanian civil population has been averted. ... This appears
      to be the case since the winding down of combat in
      connection with an agreement made with the Serbian
      leadership at the end of 1998 (Status Report of the Foreign
      Office, November 18, 1998). Since that time both the
      security situation and the conditions of life of the
      Albanian-derived population have noticeably improved. ...
      Specifically in the larger cities public life has since returned to
      relative normality (cf. on this Foreign Office, January 12,
      1999 to the Administrative Court of Trier; December 28,
      1998 to the Upper Administrative Court of Lneberg and
      December 23, 1998 to the Administrative Court at Kassel),
      even though tensions between the population groups have
      meanwhile increased due to individual acts of violence...
      Single instances of excessive acts of violence against the civil
      population, e.g. in Racak, have, in world opinion, been laid at
      the feet of the Serbian side and have aroused great
      indignation. But the number and frequency of such excesses
      do not warrant the conclusion that every Albanian living in
      Kosovo is exposed to extreme danger to life and limb nor is
      everyone who returns there threatened with death and severe

      7: Opinion of the Upper Administrative Court at Mnster,
      February 24, 1999 (Az: 14 A 3840/94,A):

      "There is no sufficient actual proof of a secret program, or
      an unspoken consensus on the Serbian side, to liquidate the
      Albanian people, to drive it out or otherwise to persecute it in
      the extreme manner presently described. ... If Serbian state
      power carries out its laws and in so doing necessarily puts
      pressure on an Albanian ethnic group which turns its back on
      the state and is for supporting a boycott, then the objective
      direction of these measures is not that of a programmatic
      persecution of this population group ...Even if the Serbian
      state were benevolently to accept or even to intend that a
      part of the citizenry which sees itself in a hopeless situation
      or opposes compulsory measures, should emigrate, this still
      does not represent a program of persecution aimed at the
      whole of the Albanian majority (in Kosovo)."

      "If moreover the (Yugoslav) state reacts to separatist
      strivings with consistent and harsh execution of its laws and
      with anti-separatist measures, and if some of those involved
      decide to go abroad as a result, this is still not a deliberate
      policy of the (Yugoslav) state aiming at ostracizing and
      expelling the minority; on the contrary it is directed toward
      keeping this people within the state federation."

      "Events since February and March 1998 do not evidence a
      persecution program based on Albanian ethnicity. The
      measures taken by the armed Serbian forces are in the first
      instance directed toward combatting the KLA and its
      supposed adherents and supporters."

                    ------ Translator's Notes ------

      As in the case of the Clinton Administration, the present regime in
      Germany, specifically Joschka Fischer's Foreign Office, has justified its
      intervention in Kosovo by pointing to a "humanitarian catastrophe,"
      "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" occurring there, especially in the months
      immediately preceding the NATO attack. The following internal
      documents from Fischer's ministry and from various regional
      Administrative Courts in Germany spanning the year before the start of
      NATO's air attacks, attest that criteria of ethnic cleansing and genocide
      were not met. The Foreign Office documents were responses to the
      courts' needs in deciding the status of Kosovo-Albanian refugees in
      Germany. Although one might in these cases suppose a bias in favor of
      downplaying a humanitarian catastrophe in order to limit refugees, it
      nevertheless remains highly significant that the Foreign Office, in contrast
      to its public assertion of ethnic cleansing and genocide in justifying NATO
      intervention, privately continued to deny their existence as Yugoslav
      policy in this crucial period. And this continued to be their assessment
      even in March of this year. Thus these documents tend to show that
      stopping genocide was not the reason the German government, and by
      implication NATO, intervened in Kosovo, and that genocide (as
      understood in German and international law) in Kosovo did not precede
      NATO bombardment, at least not from early 1998 through March,
      1999, but is a product of it.

      Excerpts from the these official documents were obtained by IALANA
      (International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms) which sent
      them to various media. The texts used here were published in the German
      daily junge welt on April 24, 1999. (See as well as the
commentary at

      According to my sources, this is as complete a reproduction of the
      documents as exists in the German media at the time of this writing.

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